Social cognition


(2005) With M. Jeannerod. The motor theory of social cognition: a critique. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, 1, 21-25.

(2008) What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language 23, 2, 190-223.

(2009) The tuning fork model of human social cognition: a critique. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 1, 229-243

(2009) A Philosopher's Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 3, 570-595.

(2011) The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2:519–540.

(2012) With G. Gergely. Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy. In J. B. Benson, F. Xu and T. Kushnir (eds.), Rational Constructivism in Cognitive Development, pp. 59–94.

(2012) Sharing and ascribing goals. Mind and Language,  27, 2, 202-229.

(2012) With F. De Vignemont, What is it like to feel another's pain? Philosophy of Science Association, 79, 2, 295-316.

(2013) How from action-mirroring to intention-ascription? Consciousness and Cognition.

(2013) A puzzle about belief-ascription. In B. Kaldis (ed.) Mind and Society: Cognitive Science meets the Social Sciences, Synthese Library.

(2014) (with Katharina Helming & Brent Strickland) Making sense of early false-belief understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18, 4, 167-170.   

(2015) Millikan's teleosemantics and communicative agency. In T. Metzinger & J. Windt (eds.) Open Mind.

(2015) (with Guillaume Dezecache & Julie Grèzes) Emotional contagion: its scope and limits. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19, 6, 297-299. 

(in press) (with Katharina Helming & Brent Strickland) Solving the puzzle about early belief-ascription. Mind and Language